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PRESERVING THE PAST: HISTORIC
PRESERVATION REGULATIONS AND
THE TAKING CLAUSE
Since 1931, when the City of Charleston, South Carolina, enacted
legislation creating the Old Charleston District,1 the federal govern-
ment,2 all fifty states,' and many municipalities4 have enacted some
form of legislation to preserve America's architectural and historic
past.' Existing historic district and historic landmark6 legislation regu-
1. See J. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 133 (1965) [hereinafter
MORRISON].
2. The Federal government enacted the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w (1982) in 1966. The NHPA establishes the National
Register of Historic Places and authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate
criteria that properties must meet for placement on the Register. 16 U.S.C. § 470a
(1980).
3. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have passed some form of preserva-
tion legislation, ranging from comprehensive coverage, to general enabling !egislation,
to merely authorizing a state agency to purchase historic properties. For examples of
comprehensive coverage, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-147a-m (1981) (statute origi-
nally passed in 1961 dealing with historic districts); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1001-1015
(1981) (originally passed in 1978, the statute protects historic landmarks and historic
districts); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 (West 1975, Supp. 1986) (originally passed in
1974, regulates historic districts). See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 1l9aa-dd (McKinney
1986). For examples of limited legislation, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-50.1 (1986)
(the state government enacted the current legislation in 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-
45-1 to 10 (1984) (the Rhode Island legislature passed the Historic Preservation Com-
mission Act in 1968).
4. See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
5. See MORRISON, supra note 1, at 61-186 (1965) and J. MORRISON, SUPPLEMENT
TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 45-96 (1972) [hereinafter MORRISON SUPPLEMENT]
for a representative sampling of state and municipal legislation regulating historic dis-
tricts and historic landmarks. Morrison notes that in reality, Louisiana passed the first
act creating a historic district in 1924. That act, regulating the Old French Quarter
(Vieux Carre) in New Orleans, never went into effect. Only after the state passed a
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lates the demolition, construction and maintenance of structures.7
Some state enabling legislation allows municipalities to regulate interi-
ors designated as landmarks.' In addition, other legislation imposes
significant penalties against landowners who violate historic dis-
trict/landmark mandates.9 These penalties combined with often strin-
gent rehabilitation requirements l°  make conflicts between
constitutional amendment in 1936 was the historic district legislation extended to pro-
tect the Vieux Carre. MORRISON, supra note 1, at 17.
6. A historic district is an entire area designated as historic. See MORRISON, supra
note 1, at 18-19. An example is the French Quarter in New Orleans, where all buildings
are regulated by the historic district ordinance. MOmuSON, supra note 1, at 19. A
historic landmark is a building or other structure on a particular site, Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which is specifically regulated by
historic landmark legislation, regardless of the status of other structures in the area.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 110-11. An example is Grand Central Station in New York
city.
7. See infra notes 118-133 and accompanying text.
8. Interior regulations are far less common than exterior regulations. Courts may
imply their existence from other legislation. States affirmatively permitting regulation
of historic interiors include: The District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANNOT. § 5-1002
(1981) (in defining the term "alter," the statute states: "'alter' or 'alteration' ... means
a change in any interior space which has been specifically designated as an historic
landmark"); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-11-5 (Bums, 1981) (interior regulations
permissible if the features are subject to public view); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 1553 (1986) ("A preservation interest may... forbid, limit or require... interior
alterations of an historic property, including, but not limited to, maintenance, renova-
tion, construction or decoration .... ."); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3407(5) (Cal-
laghan, 1982) (interior arrangements may be regulated if specifically authorized by the
local legislative body).
Several states specifically forbid the regulation of interior space, including Connecti-
cut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-147f (1981); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 67-4608 (1980); Louisi-
ana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 758 (1975); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40C,
§ 7 (1986); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-397 (1982); and South Dakota,
S.D. CODIMED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-44 (1985).
9. See infra notes 174 to 183. Several cities enacted statutes providing that if a
landowner begins to demolish a historic structure without prior approval, the land-
owner must rebuild the structure to comply with Department of the Interior Guide-
lines. See 5 Preservation L. Rpt. 3006 (1985).
10. For example, the Connecticut statute provides:
In passing on appropriateness as to exterior architectural features, buildings or
structures, the commission shall consider, in addition to other pertinent factors, the
type and style of exterior windows, doors, light fixtures, signs, aboveground utility
structures, mechanical appurtenances and the type and texture of building materi-
als. In passing upon appropriateness as to exterior architectural features the com-
mission shall also consider, in addition to any other pertinent factors, the general
design, arrangement, texture and material of the architectural features involved
and the relationship thereof to the exterior architectural style and pertinent fea-
tures of other buildings and structures in the immediate neighborhood....
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preservationists and developers inevitable.11 Challengers may contest
preservation legislation by relying on constitutional arguments based
on the taking clause12 and the appropriate scope of a state's police
power.' 3 This Note will review judicial responses to historic legislation
regulating exterior design features, 4 exterior maintenance, 5 interior
architectural features,' 6 and penalty provisions.17 In particular, it will
examine the status of such legislation in light of three recent United
States Supreme Court taking clause cases.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION LEGISLATION
By 1965 every state had enacted some form of historic preservation
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7-147f(a) (1961).
11. In a newspaper article on the conflict between preservationists and businesses in
the Vieux Carre, Malcolm Heard, a Tulane University instructor and an architect,
stated: "If the first 50 years of the Vieux Carre Commission succeeded in getting the
physical aspect of the Quarter under control ... then perhaps during the next 50 years it
could concentrate on the idea that the Quarter remains a viable neighborhood-a place
where people work, live and tourists come." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 21, 1987,
at 3F, col. 3. This statement summarizes the tension between preservation for the sake
of history, and preservation to attract tourist revenue-an important concern in oil-
dependent Louisiana. While the area residents seek to maintain the integrity of the
architecture, businesses may prefer preservation only at the lowest possible cost.
12. The taking clause of the fifth amendment states: "No person shall ... be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT., amend. V. The fifth
amendment taking clause was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Chicago, B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
Professor Michelman notes:
'Taking' is, of course, constitutional law's expression for any sort of publicly in-
flicted private injury for which the Constitution requires payment of compensation.
Whether a particular injurious result or governmental activity is to be classed as a
'taking' is a question which usually arises where the nature of the activity and its
causation of private loss are not themselves disputed.
Michelman, Property, Utility & Fairnew Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just
Compensation'Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1165 (1967). To decide what is a taking is
to determine "when government may execute a public program while leaving associated
costs disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id
13. See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text for an explanation of the police
power.
14. See infra notes 105-116 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 117-147 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 148-173 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 174-186 and accompanying text.
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legislation'" and, by 1976, had granted municipalities and counties the
authority to enact historic preservation laws. 9 The federal govern-
ment passed the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)2° in
1966. In NHPA, Congress recognized the importance of the historic
and cultural foundations of the United States as reflected in historic
properties.2 ' Congress amended the statute in 1980 to provide that if
the owner of a historic property objects to its inclusion on the National
Register of Historic Places,22 the government will not designate the
18. MoRIUsoN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, at 1. See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
107.
19. N. ROBINSON, SCOPE & SOURCES OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW: REHA-
BILITATING HISTORIC PROPERTIES 15 (1984). By 1976, over 500 local historic preser-
vation laws existed.
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470w (1980).
21. Specifically, the statute states:
(b) The Congress finds and deolares that-
(1) the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its
historic heritage;
(2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as
a living part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of
orientation to the American people;
(3) historic properties significant to the Nation's heritage are being lost or sub-
stantially altered, often inadvertently, with increasing frequency;
(4) the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that
its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and en-
ergy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations of Americans;
(5) in the face of ever-increasing extensions of urban centers, highways, and resi-
dential, commercial, and industrial developments, the present governmental and
nongovernmental historic preservation programs and activities are inadequate to
insure future generations a genuine opportunity to appreciate and enjoy the rich
heritage of our Nation;
(6) the increased knowledge of our historic resources, the establishment of better
means of identifying and administering them, and the encouragement of their pres-
ervation will improve the planning and execution of Federal and federally assisted
projects and will assist economic growth and development; and
(7) although the major burdens of historic preservation have been borne and
major efforts initiated by private agencies and individuals, and both should con-
tinue to play a vital role, it is nevertheless necessary and appropriate for the Fed-
eral Government to accelerate its historic preservation programs and activities, to
give maximum encouragement to agencies and individuals undertaking preserva-
tion by private means, and to assist State and local governments and the National
Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States to expand and accelerate their
historic preservation programs and activities.
16 U.S.C. § 470 (1980). See also H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6378-6388, for the legislative his-
tory of NHPA.
22. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. One state statute defines the National
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property as such unless the landowner withdraws his or her objec-
tion. 3  Similar provisions exist in the enabling legislation of various
states.24 State and local governments justify the implementation of his-
toric property legislation by emphasizing the economic,25 educational,
historic, cultural, and aesthetic benefits of preservation.26 Some state
enabling legislation grants local legislative bodies significant discretion
to determine the scope of local preservation laws.27
Register as "[t]he national register of districts, sites, buildings, structures and objects
significant in American history, architecture, archeology and culture." ALA. CODE
§ 41-10-136 (1982).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(6) (1980). If the owner of any privately owned property, or a
majority of the owners of such properties within the historic district object to inclusion
or designation on the National Register, the property will not be included on the Na-
tional Register or designated as a National Historic Landmark until the objection is
withdrawn. Id.
24. New York, for example, amended its statute to remove the section requiring
landowner approval for designation as a historic site. See FGL&L Property Corp. v.
City of Rye, 66 N.Y.2d 111, 485 N.E.2d 986, 992 (N.Y. 1985). States in which land-
owner approval is required before the government can designate the property as historic
include: Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24.80.1-107 (1982); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1e (1986); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-11-205 (1985); Vir-
ginia, VA. CODE § 10-138 (1985); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 8-26A-3 (1984).
25. Economically, many areas benefit from preservation because tourists are at-
tracted to historic districts (Colonial Williamsburg in Virginia and the French Quarter
in New Orleans, for example). See A HANDBOOK ON HIsTORIc PRESERVATION LAW
63-64 (C. Duerksen ed. 1983) [hereinafter Duerksen]. See also Struggle Over the French
Quarter: New Orleans Wants to Preserve Charm and Attract Tourists, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, January 21, 1987, p. 3F, col. 3.
26. Duerksen, supra note 25, at 63-64. See also id. A1-127 app., Recommended
Model Provision for a Preservation Ordinance, with Annotations, prepared by the Na-
tional Trust for Historic Preservation. The appendix excerpts local ordinances through-
out the U.S.
The District of Columbia code lists the purposes of its preservation legislation as
safeguarding "the city's historic, aesthetic and cultural heritage ... foster[ing] civic
pride ... enhanc[ing] the city's attraction to visitors and the support and stimulus to the
economy thereby provided .. " D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1001 (1981).
Idaho provides in its list of purposes that "the historical, archeological, architectural
and cultural heritage is among the most important environmental assets of the state...
and [the purpose of the statute is] to promote the use and conservation of such property
for the education, inspiration, pleasure and enrichment of the citizens of this state ......
IDAHO CODE § 67-4601 (1980).
27. Indiana, for example, allows the local governing body to decide whether to reg-
ulate interior landmarks. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-11-5 (Burns 1981). See also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 14-2002 (1983) and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:46 (1986) for examples
of statutes that give local government significant discretion.
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II. THE TAKING CLAUSE ISSUE-PRE-1987 CASE LAW
State or local governments that wish to enact historic preservation
laws may face several constitutional challenges from landowners.28
Property owners may argue that the legislation is an invalid exercise of
the police power.29 Additionally, a landowner may dispute the legisla-
tion's validity on due process30 grounds. Alternatively, an owner may
allege that the legislation constitutes a taking of property without com-
pensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.31 This
Note will focus on the taking clause controversy.
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the United States Supreme Court
first addressed the taking issue with regard to a regulatory land use
law.32 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes stated the now classic
principle that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 33 The Penn-
sylvania Coal decision established a balancing test: a taking occurs
only where the injury to a single landowner outweighs the public
interest.34
The Pennsylvania Coal Court also examined whether the statute con-
ferred an "average reciprocity of advantage"; 35 that is, did the land-
owner also benefit in some way from the regulation? The Court
28. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. The cases in that note reflect the
tension between preservationists and landowners.
29. Some statutes explicitly state that the statute is passed pursuant to the police
power. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-904 (1985) ("It is hereby declared to be public
policy and in the best interests of the general economic, social, and educational welfare
of all citizens of Arkansas for this state to [be] engaged in ...historic preserva-
tion.... ."); CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 24-80.1-101 (1982) ("[T]he preservation of such [his-
toric] resources is in the interest of the citizens of the state.. ..").
30. Often, procedural due process challengers dispute the legitimacy of the adminis-
trative process. Such due process issues are beyond the scope of this note. See
Bonderman, Constitutional Law, in Duerksen, supra note 25, at 343-50.
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for an explanation of the taking
clause.
32. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also supra notes 52-64 discussing Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). In Keystone, on facts remark-
ably similar to those of Pennsylvania Coal, the Court declined to find a taking.
33. 260 U.S. at 415. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found a taking of private
property without just compensation.
34. I
35. Id. at 415. See also Idt at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); "[T]here was no recip-
rocal advantage to the owner... unless it be the advantage of living and doing business
in a civilized community. That reciprocal advantage is given by the act to the coal
operators." Ida (citations omitted).
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concluded that the regulation imposed a high cost on the owner of
subsurface rights without conferring a benefit.36 In addition, because
the regulation prohibited the coal company from using its subsurface
property rights, the land's value diminished substantially. 37 As a re-
sult, the Pennsylvania Coal Court found a taking of private property
without just compensation.38 Since Pennsylvania Coal, however,
courts have been reluctant to find that a government action constitutes
a taking.
The leading taking case in the area of historic preservation is Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.39 The Penn Central
Court was unable to establish a specific "taking" formula.4° Neverthe-
less, Justice Brennan indicated that if a regulation's restrictions are
substantially related to promoting the public welfare and permit "rea-
sonable beneficial use," then there is no "taking., 4 1 Justice Brennan
did, however, enumerate several factors that courts should consider in
taking clause analysis, including the landowner's reasonable invest-
36. Id. at 416.
37. Id. at 413. The Court stated: "The government could hardly go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law." Id
38. Id. at 416.
39. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central Terminal
sought to build a 50 story office building atop the terminal. The terminal structure,
declared a historic landmark in 1967, is "a magnificent example of the French beaux-
arts style .. " Id at 115. The New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission
refused permission to build the structure, stating that "to balance a 55-story office tower
above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke." Id
at 117-18. Penn Central, the landowner, charged that applying the preservation law
constituted a taking of property without compensation. The trial court decided in the
owner's favor, but the state appellate court reversed. Id at 119-20. Justice Brennan
wrote the U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding the appellate court's reversal. Jus-
tices Rehnquist, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger dissented.
40. Id. at 124. The Court stated:
[T1his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for deter-
mining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
on a few persons.... Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particu-
lar restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any
losses proximately caused by it depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances
[in that] case.'
Id.
41. Id. at 138. Brennan noted: "The restrictions imposed are substantially related
to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of
the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only
the Terminal site proper but also other properties." Id
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ment-backed expectations.42
Investment-backed expectations arise when property owners invest
in property believing that they will benefit from its development.43 A
landowner frustrated from realizing this anticipated gain by preserva-
tion regulations may raise a taking challenge. Although the Supreme
Court has yet to address the issue, the purchaser of property with his-
toric regulations already attached is probably unable to raise the invest-
ment-backed expectations claim. Because the buyer has notice of the
restrictions,' he cannot realistically expect benefits outside of the pres-
ervation context.4 5
Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan Cable Television Corp. 6 indicated that the Court views even a
slight physical occupation as more objectionable than any form of a
regulatory taking.47
III. 1987 SUPREME COURT TAKING CLAUSE CASES
The United States Supreme Court handed down three taking clause
decisions in 1987, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedic-
42. Id. at 131. While no set formula by which to analyze a taking claim exists, the
Court will examine several factors, including economic impact of the regulation on the
property owner, "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations," the character of the governmental action (e.g., whether
there is a physical invasion), and the reasonable expectations of the property owner. Id.
at 124.
43. In his recent article, Professor Daniel Mandelker extensively examined invest-
ment-backed expectations. He stated: "Investment-backed expectations arise in prop-
erty markets, where market participants invest with the expectation that they will
obtain capital gains from the development of their property. . . . The question is
whether a taking occurs if market-created expectations in capital gains are frustrated."
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U. J. URD.
& CONTEMP. L. 3, 4 (1987).
44. See Mandelker, supra note 43, at 12-13. A land use regulation devaluing
unowned land is not a taking because the buyer has notice of the conditions attached.
Id. at 12.
45. Professor Mandelker discusses investment-backed expectations in the historic
preservation context. See Mandelker, supra note 43, at 24-27 (on investment-backed
expectations in property markets) and 35-37 (discussing the application of investment-
backed expectations to historic landmark restrictions).
46. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
47. Id. at 436. Justice Marshall specifically stated that "such a... [physical] occu-
pation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regu-
lation that imposes affirmative duties upon the owner, since the owner may have no
control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion." Id.
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tis,4" Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,49 and First English Ev-
angelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.5"
Considering how difficult it is for plaintiffs to meet the Court's ripeness
requirement, all three cases are important.51 However, Keystone and
First Evangelical Church probably will have the most significant impact
on historic preservation law.
The facts of Keystone parallel those of the earlier Pennsylvania Coal
decision.52 In response to a subsidence problem, the state of Penn-
sylvania enacted legislation restricting coal mining.53 The new law re-
quires miners to keep in place 50% of the coal under buildings.54
Keystone Coal challenged the statute, alleging it constituted a taking of
the company's property without just compensation. 5 The Court dis-
tinguished Pennsylvania Coal.56 The Court examined the public pur-
pose behind the legislation, finding it "genuine, substantial, and
legitimate,"57 and therefore refused to find a taking.58
In Keystone, the Court considered such factors as reciprocity of ad-
vantage, diminution in value, and investment-backed expectations.
The Court found that the regulation conferred an average reciprocity
48. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
49. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
50. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
51. In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of John-
son City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Supreme Court made it difficult for an as applied
taking case to be ripe for consideration. The Court stated that a taking issue is ripe only
if the plaintiff applied for all available variances and sought compensation through the
state's inverse condemnation procedures. See Merriam, Caught in the Takings Muddle:
Legally, We've Been Had, PLAN. 23, 26 (Aug. 1985) (discussing the ramifications of the
Hamilton Bank decision for land use lawyers and city planners).
52. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
53. 107 S. Ct. at 1236-37. Subsidence causes many problems, including damage to
existing structures and the inhibition of future development because of sinkholes and
other environmental problems. Id. at 1237.
54. Id at 1238. The law permitted the state to revoke a mining permit if removing
the coal would harm the structure and the mining company failed to cure the problem.
Id.
55. Id. at 1238-39. Keystone Coal also alleged that the law violated the Constitu-
tion's contracts clause. Id at 1236, 1239.
56. Id. at 1242. The Court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal, stating that the current
state law addresses a perceived "significant threat to the common welfare," that the
company is still able to engage in business, and that there is no interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations. Id.
57. Id. at 1242.
58. Id. at 1251.
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of advantage, since the benefit to the public, including the company,
outweighed the burden on the individual landowner.5 9 With regard to
the company's claim of economic injury due to the property's diminu-
tion in value, the Court stated that the landowner was unable to show a
deprivation significant enough to demonstrate a regulatory taking.
6 °
The Court held that to succeed in a facial attack, the challenger must
show the statute denies him all "economically viable use of his land."61
Consequently, a court must examine the property to determine if any
viable use remains. 2 The Court concluded that because the regulation
requires only that a small percentage of coal remains in place, the law
does not frustrate the landowner's investment-backed expectations.6
Thus, the facial challenge to the legislation failed.6
4
In Nollan,65 the California Coastal Commission conditioned a re-
building permit on the owner's granting the city an easement for beach
access.66 In a five to four decision, the Court characterized the access
condition as a "permanent physical occupation" and found a taking. 67
Because the Court found physical rather than a regulatory taking, the
59. Id at 1245.
60. Id. at 1246. The Court noted that since this was a facial challenge to the statute,
the court below granted summary judgment. Thus, the company may have had evi-
dence of significant harm, but was unable to present it because of the law's facial valid-
ity. Id
The burden of demonstrating a regulatory taking is significant. In contrast, Loretto
suggests that showing a physical taking is relatively simple. See supra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text discussing Loretto.
61. 107 S. Ct. at 1247. The Court excerpts the district court opinion, quoting Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
62. 107 S. Ct. at 1248. The Court stated that it must examine the entire bundle of
property rights. Destroying one strand alone does not constitute a taking since "the
aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,
65-66 (1979)).
63. Id at 1249-50. The Court further concluded that the law regulates only a small
part of the company's total land. Id. at 1250-51.
64. Id. at 1253.
65. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
66. Id. at 3143. The Nollans owned beachfront property and sought to tear down
the existing bungalow and construct a three bedroom home. Seeking to prevent the
house from becoming a "psychological barrier" to those desiring access to the beach,
the commission conditioned approval of the building permit on the landowners granting
an easement across their property. Id.
67. Id. at 3145. The Court quoted Loretto, stating that where there is a permanent
physical occupation of property, a finding of a taking is almost inevitable. Nollan, 107
S. Ct. at 3145.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/11
19881 HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND THE TAKING CLAUSE 307
impact of Nollan on preservation legislation is limited. The most sig-
nificant part of the case for preservationists is the finding that there
must be a substantial relation, or close nexus, between a condition pre-
cedent and a legitimate governmental purpose.68
Finally, in First English,69 the Court decided that a landowner who
successfully establishes a taking can recover molietary damages.70 The
church owned property on which it built a recreation area for handi-
capped children.7" A fire destroyed the forestry on a surrounding hill-
side and a subsequent flood destroyed the campground.7 2 In response,
Los Angeles County passed an interim ordinance prohibiting all build-
ing in the flood zone.73 The Court stated that a taking must be found
before reaching the remedial question,74 and therefore remanded the
case for reconsideration of the taking issue and valuation of a
remedy.75
Nevertheless, the Court assumed that the ordinance76 was a taking
of private property for public use without compensation. 77 The major-
68. Id. at 3148. The Court stated: "In short, unless the permit condition serves the
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation of land use but an 'out-and-out plan of extortion." Id. (quoting J.E.D.
Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, finding that the permit condi-
tion did not interfere with the Nollans' investment-backed expectations, since the public
has a right of access to the beach. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3151, 3152, 3153-54. In addi-
tion, the state can use its police power "to impose conditions on private development."
Id at 3151.
Justice Stevens also dissented, stating that the Court's holding in First English, infra
notes 69-87, led to the vague standards erroneously applied in this case. Id at 3163-64.
69. 107 S. Ct. 1278 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, joined
by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Scalia. Id at 2381.
70. Id. at 2389. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address this question
previously, but declined to do so in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106
S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172 (1985); and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981).
71. Id. at 2381.
72. Id at 2381.
73. Id
74. Id at 2382.
75. Id at 2384-85. The Court further stated: "Here we must assume that the Los
Angeles County ordinances have denied appellant all use of its property for a considera-
ble period of years.. . ." Id at 2389.
76. The ordinance was an "interim" one. However, the Court found that this "tem-
porary" taking was in reality permanent. Id at 2387.
77. Id. at 2389.
Washington University Open Scholarship
308 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:297
ity rejected the idea that repeal of the ordinance would adequately
compensate an injured landowner.78 Instead, the Court awarded mon-
etary compensation, directing the court below to calculate the land-
owner's property value losses from the time of the invalid ordinance's
enactment to its repeal.7 9 The Court limited its holding to the facts
presented, and specifically stated that the case would not require com-
pensation for normal delays in the planning process.80
In dissent, Justice Stevens vehemently disagreed with the majority
opinion.81 He emphasized that the Court's holding did not require the
state to compensate the church for the effects of the ordinance,82 stat-
ing that precedent establishes that this sort of regulatory scheme is not
a taking.83 Stevens argued that legislative enactments enjoy a strong
presumption of validity, and summarily rejected the church's taking
claim. 84
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's finding that when
there is a taking, the government can either discontinue the regulation
or continue to regulate and compensate the property owner.85 Stevens
would give monetary relief only for a regulatory taking that was "sub-
stantial" and "in effect for a significant percentage of the property's
useful life.",8 6 Justice Stevens noted that the majority's decision will
78. Id. at 2388. The Court found that "[i]nvalidation of the ordinance or its succes-
sor ordinance... is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause." Id.
79. Id. at 2388. The Court further stated that "depreciation in value of the property
by reason of preliminary activity is not chargeable to the government." Id.
80. Id. at 2389.
81. 107 S. Ct. at 2389-2400. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun joined in the dissent-
ing opinion.
82. Id. at 2391.
83. Id. The majority did not find a taking, but assumed one for the purpose of
reaching the remedial question. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. Justice
Stevens stated:
[Thus, although the Court uses the allegations of this complaint as a springboard
for its discussion of a discrete legal issue, it does not, and could not under our
precedents, hold that the allegations sufficiently alleged a taking or that the
County's effort to preserve life and property could ever constitute a taking.
107 S. Ct. at 2392.
84. Id. at 2392-93. Justice Stevens points out that it is inconceivable that the
church could even expect to build anything on property in the middle of a flood zone.
Id. at 2392.
85. Id. at 2393.
86. Id. at 2394. Justice Stevens uses the diminution in value inquiry and would look
at the overall effect of the regulation on the entire project, as well as other potentially
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deter local land use planners from implementing any program that may
lead to a taking clause action for damages.87
These cases have muddled taking clause jurisprudence. Keystone
suggests that landowners will have difficulty proving a regulatory tak-
ing, while Nollan suggests that land use planners must satisfy a strin-
gent nexus test, and First English promises harsh results for an
offending government.
IV. THE POLICE POWER-AUTHORITY FOR ENACTING
LAND USE REGULATIONS
State and local governing bodies generally enact land use laws based
upon the police power.8" In 1926, the United States Supreme Court
legitimized municipal use of the police power to enact zoning ordi-
nances.89 Previous Supreme Court cases suggested that a valid police
power regulation could never be a "taking."
90
To determine the validity of a land use regulation, courts examine
whether the ordinance is a reasonable attempt to promote the public
health, safety, or general welfare. 91 For example, the court in Maher v.
profitable uses of the land, and the duration of the restriction. Id, Justice Stevens reit-
erates Agins, holding that "Im]ere fluctuations in value during the process of govern-
mental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership'...."
and courts cannot consider them a taking. Id. at 2395 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1981)) (citations omitted).
87. 107 S. Ct. at 2399. Justice Stevens stated:
The policy implications of today's decision are obvious and, I fear, far reaching.
Cautious local officials and land-use planners may avoid taking any action that
might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damage action. Much important
regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the health and safety area...
(citations omitted).
Id. at 2399-2400.
88. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
89. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
90. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), and Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928). See also Bonderman, Federal Constitutional Issues, in A HANDBOOK ON His-
TORIC PRESERVATION LAW 351-52 n.24 (C. Duerksen ed. 1983).
91. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 28, 32 (1954) ("[S]ubject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive...."); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d
1051, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1975) (the city must be acting within the police power and the
regulatory ordinance must bear a "real and substantial relation to a legitimate state
purpose"); Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 421, 106 Cal. Rptr.
333, 336 (1973) (preservation of Old San Diego for educational and cultural reasons is
within the definition of the general public welfare); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223
La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798, 802 (1953) (preservation of the Vieux Carre attracts tourists,
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City of New Orleans92 balanced the ordinance's public benefit against
the individual landowner's freedom to dispose of the property.9" Ap-
plying this balancing test, courts can determine if the legislature over-
stepped the boundaries of the police power94 by enacting an arbitrary
or confiscatory statute.95
The Supreme Court applies a presumption of constitutionality for
the governing body's determinations96 because use of the police power
is an exercise of legislative discretion. 97 Both states and municipalities
enjoy this presumption. 98 State legislatures often delegate substantial
authority to local preservation districts along with certain standards
the local commission must follow to legitimize its use of the police
thereby promoting the economic general public welfare); Lafayette Park Baptist Church
v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd, 599 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1980)
(the validity of a zoning ordinance determined by whether the restriction imposed bears
a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare); A-S-P
Associates v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444, 450 (1979) (preservation of
historic districts promotes the general public welfare by providing a visual medium to
understand the country's heritage); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wie-
land, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222, cert denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (protection of
property values constitutes a legitimate exercise of the police power to promote the
public welfare).
92. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975). Maher was the first case to deal with the consti-
tutionality of a historic district ordinance. The ordinance in question created the Vieux
Carre Commission in New Orleans.
93. Id. at 1059.
94. d at 1059. See also A-S-P Associates, 258 S.E.2d at 448-49, stating that where
there is a challenge to the legislature's police power, the court must ask:
Is the object of the legislation within the scope of the police power?... Consider-
ing all the surrounding circumstances and particular facts of the case, is the means
by which the governmental entity has chosen to regulate reasonable? ... Is the
statute in its application reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of a
public good, and.., is the interference with the owner's right to use his property as
he deems appropriate reasonable in degree?
Id
Maher suggests that courts cannot place fixed constraints upon the exercise of the
police power in the future; thus, the Court must decide each case on its own facts. The
Supreme Court in the Berman case concluded that it is impossible to define the police
power because each definition turns on a specific set of facts. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
95. Figarsky v. Historic District Commission, 368 A.2d 163, 171-72 (1976).
96. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
97. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Maher, 516 F.2d at 1058.
98. City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13, 15 (1964).
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power.99 In the preservation context, courts have found that legitimate
exercises of the police power include revitalizing urban areas,"° en-
couraging tourism, 01 preserving and enhancing property values,1 "2
preserving historic and cultural heritage,103 and developing a more at-
tractive community."°o So long as it is not used arbitrarily or capri-
ciously, the police power legitimizes most preservation enactments.
V. AESTHETIC REGULATION AND EXTERIOR DESIGN
In Penn Central,0 5 the Court stated that localities may enact land
use laws to preserve the character and aesthetics of a city.'1 6 However,
whether legislative bodies can use the police power to regulate aesthet-
ics is not as well settled in state courts.10 ' Although local historic pres-
99. Vincino v. Wethersfield Historic District Commission, No. CV80-02493375
(Hartford/New Britain Sup. Ct. Apr. 30, 1984) noted in 4 Preservation L. Rptr. 3008.
100. A-S-P Associates, 258 S.E.2d at 450; Maher, 516 F.2d at 1060.
101. Bohannan, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 336; New Orleans v.
Levy, 64 S.2d at 798; A-S-P Associates, 158 S.E.2d at 450.
102. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d at 220; FGL&L Property Corp., 485 N.E.2d at 989.
103. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1061; Bohannan, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 106 Cal. Rptr. at
336; Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Mass. 1955); A-S-P
Associates, 258 S.E.2d at 450.
104. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1060.
105. 438 U.S. 103 (1978). See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Penn Central.
106. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129. See also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974); Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
107. In Berman, the Supreme Court stated that the taking clause does not prevent
aesthetic regulation:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.... The values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled.... If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amend-
ment that stands in the way.
348 U.S. at 33-34.
State courts are moving toward the use of the police power to regulate aesthetics. For
states where the question remains unsettled, see Figarsky, 368 A.2d at 171 (though not
ripe for adjudication in this case, the court recognized modem trend toward aesthetics
alone warranting exercise of the police power); Santa Fe, 389 P.2d at 17 ("tUlnder the
restricted attack made upon the ordinance, it seems unnecessary to decide here whether
aesthetic considerations, denied under earlier decisions, furnish ground for the exercise
of the police power as is increasingly held by modem authorities."); Weiland, 69
N.W.2d at 22 (in light of Berman, it is doubtful whether 1952 case holding that the
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ervation commissions108 have legislative authority to regulate
demolition, alteration, relocation, removal, or additions to a historic
property,10 9 some courts are reluctant to allow regulations based solely
on the aesthetic value of a building. 1 While the aesthetic question is
not fully settled in state courts, most allow regulation of exterior
changes to historic structures. 1 As a result, landowners must receive
zoning power cannot be exercised for purely aesthetic considerations remains good law).
The Fifth Circuit, like most federal courts, recognized that local governments can
exercise their zoning power to regulate aesthetics. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1060. In addi-
tion, though the Figarsky court failed to directly confront the aesthetics issue, it refused
to allow demolition of a building with little historic value because it served an important
screening function for the rest of the community. Figarsky, 368 A.2d at 166-67.
Decisions refusing to uphold regulation of aesthetics alone include: Bohannan, 30
Cal. App. 3d at 422, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (regulation of aesthetics "is not a proper
objective of the police power"); City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475, 478
(1949) (holding that "[e]sthetic values alone are not a sufficient basis for classification,
but are entitled to some weight where other reasons for the exercise of the police power
are present"); A-S-PAssociates, 258 S.E.2d at 448, 450 (a statute based "purely on aes-
thetic considerations, without any real or substantial relation to... the general welfare,
deprives individuals of due process of law").
108. Most state enabling legislation authorizes the local body to establish a preser-
vation commission to review preservation-related issues. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE
§§ 67.4601-67.4612 (1980).
109. See S. Dennis, Appendix A: Model Ordinance, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC
PRESERVATION LAW A65-A69 app. (C. Duerksen ed. 1983) (sample ordinance provi-
sions listing those changes requiring a landowner to obtain a certificate of appropriate-
ness from the local preservation commission).
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. Numerous cases exist regarding appeals from denials of demolition permits.
Courts permitted exterior regulation in: Vincino, 4 Preservation L. Rptr. at 3008 (the
state can regulate all buildings within a historic district whether or not the specific
building is itself of historic value); Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W,2d
856, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) ("[U]nder an historic district ordinance ... [i]t is the
essence of such ordinances that such structures are not to be... substantially altered in
outward appearance."); City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 3 So. 2d 559, 560 (La. 1941).
The Vieux Carre ordinance requires a landowner to obtain a permit for any alterations
or additions to an existing building; also, the property owner must submit an architec-
tural plan. The court found that a change to the back of the building is considered an
exterior alteration. See also Greenley v. Board of Selectmen of Nantucket, 358 N.E.2d
1011, 1014 (Mass. 1979) (court upheld statute creating historic Nantucket, which states
that the commission shall "pass upon the appropriateness of exterior architectural fea-
tures" in the public view); Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.E.2d at 565 (discusses defini-
tion of exterior architectural feature in an ordinance regulating the exterior of historic
buildings); FGL&L Property Corp., 485 N.E.2d at 880 (section 96a of the General Mu-
nicipal Law permits the city's governing board to pass on exterior changes as long as the
police power is reasonably used); Buttnick, 719 P.2d 93, 94 (Wash. 1986) (landowner
not permitted to alter the exterior of a building when a permit to do so is denied);
Wieland, 69 N.W.2d at 219 (Board may refuse to issue a building permit'if the proposal
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a permit to change or add such items as artificial siding,112 parapets,' 13
and fences.
114
In Berman v. Parker,"5 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the validity of aesthetic regulation. The Court in Berman broadly de-
fined "public welfare" to include aesthetic concerns. Thus, a state or
local government can protect the public's interest in aesthetics through
its police power.1 16 Since the taking clause generally insulates gov-
erning bodies from liability if they regulate in the public interest, a
regulation based on aesthetics alone will probably not amount to a
taking.
VI. MANDATORY MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
Mandatory or affirmative maintenance provisions, required by many
city and state historic preservation statutes, face taking clause chal-
lenges from property owners.117 Affirmative maintenance provisions,
which require owners to preserve historic buildings,118 are especially
suited to historic districts where the integrity of the locale must be con-
served." 9 Irrespective of a structure's setting, if the cost of repair 20
will be architecturally inconsistent so as to cause "a substantial depreciation of values in
said neighborhood").
112. Vincino, 4 Preservation L. Rptr. at 3008.
113. Buttnick v. City of Seattle, 105 Wash. 2d 857, 719 P.2d 93, 94 (1986).
114. Robitson v. Board of Supervisors, No. 7796 (Loudoun County Cir. Ct., Va.,
filed Aug. 3, 1984), noted in 4 Preservation L. Rptr. 1033-34.
115. 348 U.S. 28 (1954). See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
116. Id. at 33-34.
117. Many states allow ordinary maintenance without approval from the local com-
mission. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40C, § 9 (Michie Law. Coop. 1986). Others
affirmatively require maintenance. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-4617 (1980).
118. Harris v. Parker, Chancery No. 3079 (Isle of Wight County, Va., Cir. Ct. Jan.
20, 1983) noted in 5 Preservation L. Rptr. 3007, contains an example of a municipal
historic preservation ordinance requiring affirmative maintenance. Property owners
must preserve historic buildings:
against decay and deterioration and [maintain them] free from structural defect to
the extent that such decay .,. may... result in the irreparable deterioration of any
exterior appurtenance or architectural feature or produce a detrimental effect upon
the character of the district as a whole or upon the life and character of the struc-
ture itself...
Id.
119, A-S-P Associates, 258 S.E.2d at 451.
120. See, e.g., Buttnick, 719 P.2d at 94-95 (Building Department and Preservation
Board ordered immediate stabilization of a parapet though the owner sought its
removal).
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does not impose an "unnecessary or undue hardship" on the property
owner, the court is likely to enforce the requirement. 121
Maher v. City of New Orleans was one of the earliest cases to uphold
an affirmative maintenance provision challenged as an unconstitutional
taking. 122 In Maher, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that since
the purpose of the historic district legislation was legitimate, the up-
keep of buildings in the Vieux Carre section of New Orleans was "rea-
sonably necessary" to accomplish the goals of the ordinance.123 The
court stated that the party alleging a taking must show that a
mandatory maintenance provision is unduly burdensome.1 24 Courts
must determine the reasonableness of maintenance provisions on a
case-by-case basis to ascertain the individual burden.1 21 However, a
landowner's expenditure of funds to maintain a structure does not nec-
essarily constitute an undue burden,126 nor does it mean that a taking
has occurred.1
27
Mandatory maintenance provisions are within the scope of the mu-
nicipal police power because they enhance aesthetics and prevent pub-
lie safety hazards created by deteriorating buildings. x28 Consequently,
121. Figarsky, 268 A.2d at 166; Butinick, 719 P.2d at 95. But see McCrimmon v.
City of Charleston, No. 84-CP-10-3360 (Charleston Cty. Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed Oct.
30, 1984) noted in 4 Preservation L. Rptr. 3009 (landowner seeks to install siding to
reduce maintenance costs).
122. 516 F.2d 1051, 1067 (5th Cir. 1975).
123. Id at 1066-67.
124. Id. at 1067. The plaintiff made a taking claim but failed to show that the
ordinance was unduly burdensome.
125. Id at 1067. The court stated: "In holding that the ordinance provision neces-
sitating reasonable maintenance is constitutional, we do not conclude that every appli-
cation of such an ordinance would be beyond constitutional assault." Id.
126. See Buttnick, 719 P.2d at 96 (a taking exists only if the regulation is unduly
oppressive); Harris, 5 Preservation L. Rptr. at 3007 (mandatory maintenance provision
found constitutional and court ordered significant repairs to the house). But see
FGL&L Property Corp., 485 N.E.2d at 992 ("Landmark and historic preservation law
... may be held unconstitutional... [if] it forces the owner to assume the cost of
providing a benefit to the public without recoupment.").
127. "The fact that an owner may incidentally be required to make out-of-pocket
expenditures in order to remain in compliance with an ordinance does not per se render
that ordinance a taking." Maher, 516 F.2d at 1067. For example, an ordinance requir-
ing fire alarms in every building would require a private expenditure of funds, but does
not constitute a taking. The court noted that "if the purpose be legitimate and the
means reasonably consistent with the objective, the ordinance can withstand a frontal
attack of invalidity." Id
128. City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 5 So. 2d 129, 131 (La. 1941).
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when the state's enabling legislation fails to specifically provide for a
municipal maintenance ordinance, some courts infer such authority
from the zoning power. 29 Courts will normally uphold inferred or
express maintenance provisions if the degree of maintenance required
is reasonable. 130
Utilizing some of the factors the Supreme Court has discussed in its
taking clause decisions, the validity of a mandatory maintenance provi-
sion depends on the economic cost of its implementation, including the
landowner's investment-backed expectations.131 Mandatory mainte-
nance protects the public safety by insuring that buildings are structur-
ally sound. In addition, such provisions protect the public's interest in
its historic past. A maintenance scheme, however, that costs more
than the building is worth,132 or that interferes with legitimate invest-
ment-backed expectations, may effect a taking.
Emphasis on the reasonableness of maintenance costs jeopardizes
provisions that mandate rehabilitation of historic structures. Unlike
mandatory maintenance provisions, absent explicit authority in en-
abling legislation, attempts to compel rehabilitation are beyond the
scope of municipal authority.133
In FGL&L Property Corp. v. City of Rye, the court held unconstitu-
tional a zoning ordinance mandating and specifying the manner of re-
habilitation.13 4  The case suggests that imposing unreasonable
restoration costs or conditions constitutes the taking of private prop-
erty for a public use.' 3 5 The court considered the economic and tech-
nical aspects of rehabilitation when determining the reasonableness of
the regulation. 13 6 For instance, if a property owner cannot technically
129. Harris, 5 Preservation L. Rptr. at 3007.
130. Figarsky, 368 A.2d at 169.
131. See supra note 41 and accompanying text discussing the factors examined in
Penn Central.
132. See infra notes 133-138 discussing the impact of a large economic burden on
mandatory rehabilitation requirements.
133. 66 N.Y.2d 111, 485 N.E.2d 986, 987 (N.Y. 1985). Nothing in the zoning en-
abling legislation "empowers the City to mandate the manner in which property may be
owned or held to impose upon the owner of a tract containing historic structures... the
cost of rehabilitation or enhancement of the properties."
134. Id. at 988.
135. Id. at 991. See also Lafayette, 553 S.W.2d at 864 ("[W]here a landowner is
unable because of his own financial status to rehabilitate ... enforcement of the ordi-
nance would practically serve to confiscate his land.").
136, Id. at 863.
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rehabilitate a structure, or if the cost to rehabilitate is significantly
greater than the value of any possible use of the restored structure, the
landowner and local commission may consider demolition.1"7 When a
rehabilitation ordinance involves an unreasonable expenditure of
funds, a court is likely to find the ordinance invalid as applied to the
landowner. 138
The decision in FGL&L suggests that a local ordinance may include
rehabilitation requirements provided for in the state enabling legisla-
tion. 139 Other courts and statutes provide that if it is economically and
technically reasonable to rehabilitate a building, property owners
should undertake "extreme efforts" to preserve the "streetscape," even
if the building in question is itself of little historic significance. 140
A synthesis of the recent Supreme Court decisions reveals the diffi-
culty in ascertaining whether mandatory rehabilitation provisions con-
stitute a taking. A plaintiff who is able to demonstrate ownership of
property prior to the institution of such a provision may have a legiti-
mate argument for interference with investment-backed expecta-
tions.' 1 There is a difference between the situation in Keystone, where
the regulation required the landowner to avoid any action that could
damage the public welfare, and an affirmative rehabilitation require-
ment dictating that an owner expend funds to improve a property. 142
137. Id. at 862-63.
138. Texas Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924
(Tex. 1977). A landowner is more likely to succeed on an as applied rather than facial
challenge to an ordinance because the court must determine the reasonableness of ex-
penditures on a case-by-case basis, and the state enabling legislation allows a local com-
mission to mandate restoration.
139. The court in FGL&L Property Corp. stated that a redrafted law may pass con-
stitutional muster. FGL&L Property Corp., 485 N.E.2d at 992. The court further noted
that "[w]e do not hold that the General Municipal Law sections could not be drafted to
impose restoration costs on an owner without violating the Constitution.... ." Id.
140. Lafayette, 553 S.W.2d at 860. The court held that "[e]xisting structures are to
be removed only where their conditions are judged to be beyond rehabilitation or to
accommodate important elements of the neighborhood plans. Extreme efforts must be
taken to retain the existing structures, maintain continuity and preserve the street-
scape." d.
141. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text explaining the investment-
backed expectations theory in the context of Penn Central. See supra note 63 discussing
the theory as applied in Keystone Coal.
142. Requiring a landowner to refrain from using her property to the greatest extent
possible may diminish the value of the site. Forcing an owner to expend money to
actually rehabilitate, however, appears more intrusive because such a regulation (1) tells
the landowner generally how the property should appear, (2) limits its use to one that
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Under Keystone, if any viable use of the land remains, or if the prop-
erty has any reasonable economic use, it is unlikely that a court will
find a taking. The public interest in preservation,1 4 3 along with tax
credits to landowners who rehabilitate historic properties, 1" will nor-
mally be sufficient justification for reasonable rehabilitation
requirements.
Requiring rehabilitation that would cost more than the value of the
property after repairs, however, may amount to a taking. Such a re-
quirement would force the owner of historic property to bear a large
cost without a corresponding economic benefit. Although the reciproc-
ity of advantage theory dictates that such costs are the inevitable result
of doing business in a civilized society,' 45 municipalities should avoid
will accommodate a historic structure, and (3) may require an owner to borrow funds,
and at the very least to spend money in order to comply with the statute.
The contrary argument is that an owner faced with a rehabilitation requirement may
increase the property value because (1) he is spending money to make the structure
usable; (2) if the property is in a historic district, each property that is rehabilitated
enhances the appearance and attractiveness of the area, thus allowing property values to
rise; and (3) the property owner may be able to take advantage of historic preservation
tax credits.
For examples of increased property values in a historic district where landowners
rehabilitated their properties, see Muhammad, The Next Hot Neighborhoods. The Gap,
CHICAGO 109-11 (Oct. 1987), a CHICAGO magazine article discussing rehabilitation in
the Gap area of the city. Houses increased in value almost tenfold from the 1970's, and
"[q]uite a few owners of these old houses now are holding on, anticipating that the price
will rise higher." Id. at 110 (quoting Cornelius Goodwin, Gap real estate agent and
property owner).
See infra note 144 discussing historic tax credits.
143. See, eg., the recent TIME cover story on rehabilitation in urban areas, Spiffing
up the Urban Heritage, TIME, 72-83 (Nov. 23, 1987). The article demonstrates the
mainstream appreciation of historic preservation and its prevalence throughout the
country. Id.
144. See the TIME article, supra note 143, stating:
Trendiness goes only so far. Money talks. The mania for preservation has been
propelled for the past decade by federal tax laws. Developers who rehabilitate his-
toric buildings can get back 20% of their renovation costs in the form of income
tax credits.... Under the program, which began in earnest in 1981, an estimated
$I I billion has been spent to renovate some 17,000 historic buildings in 1,800 cities
and towns.
Id at 79. See also Historic Preservation Law and Tax Planning for Old and Historic
Buildings, ALI ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 1-150 (1987) (from a seminar
conducted with the National Trust for Historic Preservation, Oct. 5-6, 1987 in Wash-
ington, D.C. where several seminars dealt with the tax aspect of historic preservation).
145. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See supra note
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imposing rehabilitation costs that exceed the property's value.
146
Otherwise, cities might be required to pay compensation for a taking
pursuant to First English.'47
VII. HISTORIC LANDMARK DESIGNATION OF
PRIVATELY OWNED INTERIORS
The battle between preservationists and opponents of stringent pres-
ervation legislation recently moved indoors. Although few municipali-
ties currently attempt to designate building interiors as historic
landmarks, several statutes and a discrete body of caselaw address this
issue. 1
48
In June of 1985 the City of Pasadena enacted a temporary ordinance
forbidding the removal of fixtures in any historic structure more than
fifty years old.149  Debate over the ordinance centered upon its
scope.'50 In an attempt to avoid a facial challenge, the council ulti-
mately decided to rely on the existing landmark ordinance. 5' Accord-
ing to the ordinance, the local commission must approve the removal
or alteration of any interior architectural feature.' 52 Violators are
guilty of a misdemeanor.'53
The District of Columbia enacted an ordinance regulating interior
features.' 5" In Weinberg v. Barry,1 55 a District of Columbia landowner
challenged the law as being facially unconstitutional, arguing that an
146. See Mandelker, supra note 43, at 26.
147. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 149-173 and accompanying text.
149. Pasadena Enacts Emergency Ordinance to Protect Architectual Features, 4
Preservation L. Rptr. 1066-67 (1985). Pasadena enacted the ordinance in response to
the sale of fixtures from an important historic house in the area. Antique enthusiasts
eagerly sought these fixtures and paid significant prices on the market. The City passed
the ordinance in a 36 hour time span to prevent the further removal of fixtures from the
house. Id
150. Id. at 1067.
151. Id. The existing ordinance requires the city's Heritage Commission "to review
any proposed alteration or demolition of historic building exteriors-and extend it to
interior fixtures on an emergency basis by expanding the scope of the ordinance."
152. Id
153. Id.
154. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1001 (1981). See supra note 8 and accompanying text
for an explication of the ordinance.
155. Weinberg v. Barry, 634 F. Supp. 86 (D.D.C. 1986). The plaintiff privately
owned the Warner Theater, which is open to the public for performances. Id. at 87.
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ordinance permitting designation of a building interior as a historic
landmark violates the taking clause. 56 Specifically, the plaintiff
charged that a taking exists because an interior designation fails to
serve a public purpose,'57 is a public invasion of private property, 158
and completely denies the landowner of any economically viable use of
the property.15 9 The court found the ordinance's purposes reason-
able'o and gave the legislature broad discretion to decide what land
uses serve a public purpose.' 61 The court also found it unnecessary
that the interior be open to public view to serve a public purpose under
the Act. 162 Because the court failed to find a facial taking, 1 63 the land-
owner in Weinberg must make an "as applied" challenge to the ordi-
nance. The court in the District of Columbia implied that it would
uphold the designation of interior private property as a historic
landmark. 6
Although scant case law exists and few states permit interior regula-
tion, 161 when municipalities invoke these statutes, taking challenges arelikely to arise. The government can justify regulating interiors exposed
156. Id. at 93.
157. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
158. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
Loretto held that even a minor physical occupation of property constitutes a taking. See
supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
159. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 and n.36.
160. The purposes of the District of Columbia's interior designation act are:
... to accomplish the protection, enhancement and perpetuation of features of
landmarks which represent distinctive elements of the city's cultural, social, eco-
nomic, political and architectural history; to safeguard the city's historic, aesthetic
and cultural heritage; to foster civil pride in the accomplishments of the past; to
protect and enhance the city's attraction to visitors, thereby supporting and stimu-
lating the economy; and to promote the use of landmarks and historic districts for
the education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the District of Columbia.
Weinberg, 634 F. Supp. at 92-93, citing D.C. Code § 5-1061(a).
161. Id at 93, citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88 (1926).
162. The court stated that the purposes of the act do not require actual public view-
ing of the interior designated as a landmark. Id at 93.
It is unlikely that the city will attempt to regulate the interiors of private homes. See,
e.g., Greenya, Is This the Future?, HISTORIC PRESERVATION 40 (Jan./Feb. 1987) (dis-
cussing the modem interior rehabilitation of a Victorian rowhouse in DuPont Circle in
the District of Columbia). Id
163. The Weinberg court noted that "[b]ecause it appears that there are conceivable
situations in which designation of a building interior would not constitute a taking, the
District of Columbia Act is not unconstitutional on its face." 634 F. Supp. at 93.
164. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 8 detailing the states that allow interior regulation.
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to public view, similar to the theater in Weinberg,166 on much the same
grounds that support exterior regulations.167 This is especially true if
the state judiciary or legislature determines that regulation of aesthetics
alone is permissible.' 68
There is a major distinction between interior and exterior regulation:
the latter is seen by passers-by and contributes to an aesthetic whole,
especially in a historic district; the former is evident only to those who
actually enter the structure. If the purpose of guidelines for exterior
rehabilitation is to ensure slightliness and preserve historic architec-
ture, interior guidelines may serve the same goals.
A facial challenge to a statute such as the one in Weinberg' 69 may
fail because of the law's public welfare purpose, but "as applied" chal-
lenges may succeed. The owner of a historic interior may successfully
combine some of the Penn Central factors170 by demonstrating interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations, unreasonable rehabilitation
costs, and diminution in the property's value. Unfortunately, courts
have not definitively indicated what combination of factors will lead to
a taking.17 1
Municipalities must therefore exercise care in assessing when to de-
mand compliance with interior regulations. The local historic commis-
sion might consider elements such as the cost of accurate interior
rehabilitation, the aesthetic, architectural, and historic importance of
the interior, the uses of the building, and the possible costs to the city
in light of First English.172 Thus, the municipality must weigh the im-
portance of the regulation to the community as a whole against poten-
tial monetary costs imposed by a taking determination. Because there
is a presumption in the city's favor, a careful balancing process will
166. 634 F. Supp. at 90.
167. See supra notes 105-116 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 107, 110-111 and accompanying text discussing the aesthetic
regulation issue.
169. 634 F. Supp. 86 (D.D.C. 1985).
170. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
171. See Mandelker, supra note 43, at 4-5, stating: "Justice Brennan [in Penn Cen-
trail did not indicate whether frustration of investment-backed expectations would be
enough to find a taking. His inclusion of these expectations in a list of 'factors' suggests
that frustration alone is not enough. The Court has not yet resolved this question...."
(citations omitted).
172. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
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probably prevent a municipality from being held liable for a taking.173
VIII. IMPERMISSIBLE DESTRUCTION OF HISTORIC PROPERTIES-
STATUTORY ENACTMENTS
The penalty provisions contained in some historic preservation ordi-
nances vary widely. 74 Generally, a penalty attaches when a land-
owner alters property without first obtaining the requisite permit.175
Furthermore, if a landowner alters or constructs a building without a
permit, the owner could be required to remove the offending use.176
Cities and states have adopted legislation penalizing landowners who
173. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of con-
stitutionality for legislative enactments).
174. In some state ordinances, no penalty provisions are specifically stated. See,
e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-861 to 41-864 (1985); other ordinances contain pro-
visions for fines. See, eg,, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-147h(b) (1981); IDAHO CODE
§ 67-4617 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 133d12 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
Still other state statutes require that the offending landowner restore the structure to
its previous condition. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-147h(a) ("Such order
may direct the removal of any building, structure or exterior architectural feature er-
ected in violation of said sections ... or the restoration of any building, structure or
exterior architectural feature altered or demolished in violation of said sections....");
D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1010(b) (1981) ("Any person who demolishes, alters or constructs
a building or structure in violation [of the code] ... shall be required to restore the
building.., and its site to its appearance prior to the violation.. ").
Criminal penalties may be levied. See, eg., D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1010(a) (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.13 (West 1987).
Still other states allow the local body to determine the remedy. See, eg., IND. CODE
ANN. § 36-7-11-18 (1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 674:50 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-399.13 (1982).
175. The permit is usually in the form of a certificate of appropriateness. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-147d (1981) which provides:
No building permit for erection of a building or structure or for alteration of an
exterior architectural feature within an historic district and no demolition permit
for demolition or removal of a building or structure within an historic district shall
be issued by a municipality or any department, agency or official thereof until a
certificate of appropriateness has been issued. A certificate of appropriateness shall
be required whether or not a building permit is required.
176. See Robitson v. Board of Supervisors, No. 7796 (Loudoun County Cir. Ct., Va.
filed Aug. 3, 1984), noted in 4 Preservation L. Rptr. 1033-34 (1984). The case involved
owners of property in a local historic district who were denied a permit to erect a chain
link fence. The plaintiff challenged the ordinance in court, but the case settled, with the
landowner agreeing to install a wooden picket fence, and "[t]o the extent that the costs
of removing the chain link fence in front and constructing the picket fence exceed the
amount the plaintiffs would have spent otherwise, those additional costs will be shared
by a Waterford preservation organization and a local developer." Id
Washington University Open Scholarship
322 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:297
try to circumvent the preservation process.17 7 Such legislation is in-
tended to deter landowners from deliberately defacing a potential
landmark property, either to avoid designation 7 ' or to lose landmark
status. 7 9 In 1985 an Indiana court enforced a municipal ordinance
mandating reconstruction for violations and ordered the reconstruction
of a facade on a state-owned historic building demolished without a
permit.'8 0 Notably, the structure was nominated for the National Reg-
ister of Historic Places.' 8 ' The court construed the ordinance to in-
clude a prohibition against demolition of a nominated site.' 82 While
penalties vary, little case law exists regarding this type of penalty
provision. 1
3
If property is demolished pursuant to the issuance of a municipal
permit, a plaintiff may have a valid taking claim if the city requires
reconstruction. Since the permit holder relied on the city in demolish-
177. 1 Preservation L. Rptr. 12,007 (1982).
178. Id
179. Idaho, for example, penalizes "the deterioration by willful neglect of any desig-
nated historic property or any property within an established historic district." IDAHO
CODE § 67-4617 (1980). Similarly, South Dakota provides:
The governing body of any county or municipality may enact an ordinance to pre-
vent the deterioration by intentional neglect of any designated historic property or
any property within an established historic district. Any property owner violating
an ordinance established pursuant to this section shall be guilty . . . of a
misdemeanor...
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-52 (1985).
180. Indiana ex reL Historic Landmarks Foundation of Ind., Inc. v. White River
Development Comm'n, No. 5385-112 (Marion Cty. Ind. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1985) noted
in 5 Preservation L. Rptr. 3005 (1985). The case involved a state-owned school, nomi-
nated, but not yet on the National Register of Historic Places. The building was par-
tially demolished after the School Board met during a late night surreptitious session to
avoid preservationists. The Board ordered demolition within hours after the meeting.
The construction company who began the demolition was also held liable for
reconstruction.
181. Id. at 3006. This is especially interesting in light of NHPA § 470a, which
allows a landowner to veto placement of his/her property on the National Register. 16
U.S.C. § 470a(6) (1982). See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at 3006. The Indiana ordinance allows the local legislative body to adopt
almost any penalty it chooses. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-7-11-18 & 36-1-3-8 (Bums
1981).
183. The West Virginia statute fails to recognize that a landowner may allow a
building to deteriorate in order to lose its historic status. The statute provides: "[The
commission can] [w]ith the consent of the property owners, certify & mark... struc-
tures... it has registered .... [e]stablish standards for the care and management of
certified landmarks, and withdraw such certification forfailure to maintain the standards
so prescribed.... ." (emphasis added). W. VA. CODE § 8-26A-3 (1984).
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ing the building, a requirement that the owner rebuild at his own ex-
pense may constitute a taking. A court may require the city to
compensate the owner for rebuilding and other costs."84
Absent a demolition permit, it is unlikely that a plaintiff would be
able to make an as applied taking claim against a penalty provision.
Normally, a property owner can only tear down a building after ob-
taining a permit. In the federal courts, an as applied taking claim is
not ripe until the party has pursued all appropriate appeals.185 Thus,
absent a demolition permit, an as applied claim will never be ripe for
adjudication in federal court.
Considering the strong presumption in favor of legislative enact-
ments, and the extensive purposes clause that precedes most historic
preservation legislation,'" 6 a facial taking challenge to reconstruction
laws is also likely to fail.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements have not made taking
challenges any easier for preservation opponents. Instead, Keystone 187
bolsters municipalities against taking challenges by, in effect, reversing
Pennsylvania Coal, the most persuasive regulatory taking case.1"'
Since an easement is a physical rather than a regulatory taking, Nol-
lan 189 is not as relevant to preservationists as Keystone. In addition,
since most preservation legislation "serves the same governmental pur-
pose as the development ban,"'" the Nollan taking decision does not
attach.
If a taking does occur, however, the penalty for a municipality is
extreme. First English' 9' provides that the plaintiff must have both a
184. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
185. See supra note 51 and accompanying text discussing Hamilton Bank's ripeness
requirement.
186. See supra note 26 and accompanying text discussing some of the purposes be-
hind preservation legislation.
187. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
190. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148. For example, a commission gives a certificate of
appropriateness to a landowner to construct an addition consistent with historic preser-
vation requirements. Granting the certificate and the building requirements serves the
same governmental purpose, namely, historic preservation.
191. See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
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legislative remedy in the form of repeal of the offending law and a mon-
etary remedy. Given the result in Keystone, combined with the diffi-
culty of proving ripeness from Hamilton Bank, a taking that results in
the need for monetary compensation will be rare. Nevertheless, munic-
ipalities should exercise caution when implementing unchallenged
preservation laws.
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